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Abstract
In the eyes of a rationalist like Descartes or Spinoza, human
reasoning is flawless, marching toward uncovering ultimate
truth. A few centuries later, however, culminating in the work
of Kahneman and Tversky, human reasoning was portrayed as
anything but flawless, filled with numerous misjudgments, bi-
ases, and cognitive fallacies. With further investigations, new
cognitive fallacies continually emerged, leading to a state of
affairs which can fairly be characterized as the cognitive fal-
lacy zoo! In this largely methodological work, we formally
present a principled way to bring order to this zoo. We in-
troduce the idea of establishing implication relationships (IRs)
between cognitive fallacies, formally characterizing how one
fallacy implies another. IR is analogous to, and partly in-
spired by, the fundamental concept of reduction in computa-
tional complexity theory. We present several examples of IRs
involving experimentally well-documented cognitive fallacies:
base-rate neglect, availability bias, conjunction fallacy, decoy
effect, framing effect, and Allais paradox. We conclude by
discussing how our work: (i) allows for identifying those piv-
otal cognitive fallacies whose investigation would be the most
rewarding research agenda, and importantly (ii) permits a sys-
tematized, guided research program on cognitive fallacies, mo-
tivating influential theoretical as well as experimental avenues
of future research.
Keywords: Cognitive fallacies; Reduction; Cognitive fallacy
map; Computational complexity; Methodology
1 Introduction
The Enlightenment was the golden age of human rationality.
In the eyes of a rationalist like Descartes or Spinoza, human
reasoning is flawless, marching toward uncovering ultimate
truth. Adopting the view that human experience is, at best,
partial, and at worst misleading, human reasoning was held
by rationalists to be the means for attaining truth. In Kantian
terminology, rationalists maintained that human a posteriori
knowledge is prone to imperfections, but a priori knowledge
is free of such impurities. Upon careful empirical investiga-
tions, however, human reasoning was found to systematically
deviate from normative principles like the laws of probability
and logic in numerous ways, thus strongly challenging ratio-
nalism. A few centuries since the birth of rationalism, human
reasoning is now portrayed as anything but flawless, filled
with numerous misjudgments, biases, and cognitive fallacies
(e.g., Simon, 1972; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Kahneman,
2011).
In the past few decades, empirical investigations into hu-
man reasoning led to discovery of new cognitive fallacies,
giving rise to a large, ever-growing number of documented
fallacies, a state of affairs which can fairly be characterized
as a zoo1 of cognitive fallacies (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1973, 1981b). A glance at over a hundred cognitive fallacies
listed on Wikipedia (see Fig. 1) attests to this claim.
In this largely methodological work, we formally present a
principled way to bring order to the cognitive fallacy zoo, al-
lowing for a precise characterization of how various fallacies
relate to one another. We introduce the idea of establishing an
implication relationship (IR) (denoted by ) between a pair
of cognitive fallacies, formally characterizing how the occur-
rence of one fallacy implies another. More formally, for two
cognitive fallacies A,B, the expression A B denotes that
A leads to B, i.e., the occurrence of A logically implies the
occurrence of B. As a proof-of-concept, we present several
examples of IRs involving experimentally well-documented
cognitive fallacies: base-rate neglect (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981a), availability bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), con-
junction fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983), decoy effect
(Huber, Joel, & Puto, 1982), framing effect (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1981b) and Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).
The idea of establishing IRs between pairs of cognitive
fallacies is analogous to, and partly inspired by, the founda-
tional concept of reduction in computational complexity the-
ory (see Karp, 1972; Papadimitriou, 2003; Arora & Barak,
2009; Sipser 2006), which has played a profound role in the-
oretical computer science, allowing us to formally establish
how various computational problems relate to each other and
how the solution to one sheds light on that of another. After
a brief discussion on the role of reduction in computational
complexity, we return to the formal characterization of the
notion of IR and subsequently present several examples of
IRs involving experimentally well-documented cognitive fal-
lacies. But first, some historical notes on reduction in com-
putational complexity.
2 Reduction in Computational Complexity
The notion of reduction plays a fundamental role in computa-
tional complexity theory, and in theoretical computer science
more generally. Informally put, a computational problem A
is reducible to computational problem B, if every instance of
A can be transformed into an instance of B. Therefore, the
reduction of A to B offers an indirect way of solving A, by
first reducing A to B, and then solving B.
1The term ‘cognitive fallacy zoo’ is inspired by an
analogous terminology in the computational complex-
ity literature, called ‘complexity zoo.’ For details, visit:
https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/Complexity Zoo
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Figure 1: Cognitive fallacies listed on Wikipedia. Besides qualitatively categorizing them into classes depending on the context in which
they occur, to date there exists no principled way of bringing order to these fallacies, allowing for formally characterizing how one fallacy
relates to another.
To further clarify the idea of reduction, we provide two
examples. As a first example, consider two well-known
computational problems, namely, HAMILTONIAN-PATH and
HAMILTONIAN-CYCLE. The HAMILTONIAN-PATH problem
is defined as follows: given a (directed) graph G, is there
a path which visits every node of G exactly once? The
HAMILTONIAN-CYCLE is defined as follows: given a (di-
rected) graph G, is there a cycle which visits every node of
G exactly once? It turns out that HAMILTONIAN-CYCLE
is reducible to HAMILTONIAN-PATH. Given that the defini-
tions HAMILTONIAN-CYCLE and HAMILTONIAN-PATH are
closely related (since a cycle is a path with its endpoints co-
inciding), this reduction is not especially surprising.
As a second example, let us consider HAMILTONIAN-
PATH together with the 3-COLORABILITY problem, defined
as follows: given a graph G and 3 distinct colors, can you
color the nodes of G such that the endpoints of every edge
are colored differently? At fist glance, the HAMILTONIAN-
PATH and 3-COLORABILITY appear to have no connec-
tion with one another whatsoever. Surprisingly, however, it
turns out that HAMILTONIAN-PATH can be reduced to 3-
COLORABILITY.2 Thus, the question of whether a graph G
has a Hamiltonian path can be resolved by answering if a cor-
responding graph G′ is 3-colorable.
The idea of reduction has had profound implications for
theoretical computer science, allowing for formally connect-
ing seemingly unrelated computational problems to one an-
other (see Fig. 2(a)). Had reduction not been introduced into
theoretical computer science, every computational problem
would have had to be investigated on its own, because the
solution to one would not have shed any light on the solu-
2The reduction can be established by a chain of straightforward
reductions: HAMILTONIAN-PATH to SAT, SAT to 3SAT, and fi-
nally, 3SAT to 3-COLORING.
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Figure 2: (a) A map showing reductions (directed gold lines) between a set of important computational problems (ovals) in theoretical
computer science, formally characterizing how one problem is related to another. The first demonstration of a particular reduction from one
problem to another is listed on the corresponding arrow between the two. (b) The IRs formally established in this paper, among well-known
cognitive fallacies (AvB: Availability bias, BRN: base-rate neglect, CF: conjunction fallacy, APX: Allais paradox, DE: Decoy effect, FE:
framing effect). Letters c (for causal) and l (for logical) on the arrows specify the type of an IR; see the Discussion section for details.
tion to others. It was a major breakthrough when Richard
Karp (1972) showed that a key computational problem called
SATISFIABILITY could be reduced to a number of other well-
known computational problems, a contribution for which he
was eventually awarded the Turing award in 1985. It is also
worth noting that the (in)famous P vs. N P problem in theo-
retical computer science, at its core, concerns the possibility
or impossibility of establishing a particular form of reduction.
One might wonder if an idea broadly analogous to reduc-
tion in computational complexity could be introduced into
cognitive science, allowing for formally connecting seem-
ingly different cognitive fallacies with one another, and,
hence, bring order to the cognitive fallacy zoo in a principled
manner. Primarily motivated by this, and, by analogy with
the notion of reduction in theoretical computer science, we
introduce the idea of establishing IRs between cognitive fal-
lacies, formally characterizing how one fallacy would imply
another.
3 Implication Relationships: Formalization
In what follows, we first formally introduce the idea of estab-
lishing an implication relationship (IR) (denoted by  ) be-
tween a pair of cognitive fallacies, followed by several exam-
ples of IRs involving experimentally well-documented cogni-
tive fallacies.
Definition (Implication Relationship). For two cognitive
fallacies/biases A,B, the fallacy A is said to implicate the fal-
lacy B (denoted by A B) if and only if the occurrence of A
logically implies the occurrence of B.
4 Examples on Implication Relationships
As a proof-of-concept, We next present several examples
of IRs involving experimentally well-documented cognitive
fallacies, namely, base-rate neglect (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981a), availability bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), con-
junction fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983), decoy effect
(Huber et al., 1982), framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981b), and Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).
4.1 Case Study 1: Decoy Effect Framing Effect
As our first example, we formally establish an IR between
two well-documented cognitive fallacies, namely, the decoy
effect (DE) and the framing effect (FE).
The Framing Effect (FE): If people produce different re-
sponses for two equivalent tasks, the framing effect (FE) has
occurred (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981b; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1984). In that light, FE is a violation of the extension-
ality principle (Bourgeois-Gironde & Giraud, 2009), which
prescribes that two equivalent tasks should elicit the same re-
sponse.
FE is well captured by Tversky & Kahneman (1981b):
Subjects were asked to “imagine that the U.S. is preparing for
the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume the exact scientific esti-
mate of the consequences of the programs are as follows.” In
one condition, subjects were presented with a choice between
Programs A and B, while in another condition, subjects were
asked to choose between Programs C and D:
Program A: 200 people will be saved.
Program B: There is a 13 probability that 600 people will
be saved, and a 23 probability that no people will be saved.
Program C: 400 people will die.
Program D: there is a 13 probability that nobody will die,
and a 23 probability that 600 people will die.
Despite the equivalence of these Programs pairs, a majority of
the first group preferred Program A (= C), while a majority
of the second group preferring Program D (= B).
The Decoy Effect (DE): The decoy effect (DE) refers to
a change in people’s preference between two options, when
presented with a third asymmetrically-dominated option, i.e.,
an option which is inferior to one option in all respects, but,
in comparison to the other option, it is inferior in some re-
spects and superior in others. In that light, DE is a violation
of the independence of irrelevant alternative axiom of rational
decision theory (Ray, 1973), which prescribes the following:
If A is preferred to B out of the choice set {A,B}, introducing
a third option X , hence expanding the choice set to {A,B,X},
should not make B preferable to A.
We are now well-positioned to formally present our result.
Proposition 1. The following holds:
DE FE.
Proof. According to normative principles, preference for
the choice sets {A,B} and {A,B,X} should be the same, with
X being an asymmetrically-dominated option. The rationale
is the following: Since X is inferior to one option in all re-
spects, rationally X should never be chosen; hence, the pref-
erence pattern for the choice sets {A,B} and {A,B,X} should
be identical. Therefore, whenever people’s preference pattern
for the choice sets {A,B} and {A,B,X} differs (which is the
case for DE), it logically implies the violation of the exten-
sionality principle, hence granting the occurrence of FE. This
concludes the proof. 
The message of Proposition 1 is simple: From the stand-
point of normative principles, the two choice sets {A,B}
and {A,B,X} (with X being an asymmetrically-dominated
option) are equivalent, therefore people’s showing different
preference patterns for the two choice sets, as is the case in
DE, is a clear indication of FE. Proposition 1, therefore, for-
mally establishes that the occurrence of DE leads to the oc-
currence of FE, that is, whenever DE occurs, so does FE.
4.2 Case Study 2: Base-Rate Neglect 
Conjunction Fallacy
As our second example, we formally establish an IR between
another pair of well-documented cognitive fallacies, namely,
the base-rate neglect (BRN) and the conjunction fallacy (CF).
BRN and CF can be characterized as follows.
The Base-Rate Neglect (BRN): Base-rate neglect (BRN)
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981a) refers to people not consider-
ing prior probabilities in their judgments under uncertainty.
The Conjunction Fallacy (CF): For two events A,B and
presented with evidence e, people judge the probability of the
event A∩B to be greater than that of A (or B), in isolation.
That is, more formally, people judge: P(A∩B|e)>P(A|e). In
that light, CF is a clear violation of the axioms of probability
(since ∀A,B, A∩B⊆ A⇒ P(A∩B|e)≤ P(A|e) ∀e 6=∅; that
is, the probability of a subset of Y , in principle, cannot be
greater than that of Y ).
CF is well captured in the famous Linda experiment by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Presented with a description
(e) of Linda, a politically active, single, outspoken, and very
bright 31-year-old female, people overwhelmingly judge that
Linda is more likely to be a feminist bankteller (A∩B) than
to be a bankteller (A).
We are now well-positioned to formally present our result.
Proposition 2. The following holds.
BRN CF.
Proof. Since P(A ∩ B|e) = P(e|A ∩ B)P(A ∩ B) and
P(A|e) = P(e|A)P(A), we have:
P(A∩B|e)
P(A|e) =
P(e|A∩B)
P(e|A)
P(A∩B)
P(A)
,
where the term P(A∩B)P(A) indicates the ratio between priors
P(A∩B) and P(A). If BRN occurs (which results in the term
P(A∩B)
P(A) being dropped), it follows that:
P(A∩B|e)
P(A|e) =
P(e|A∩B)
P(e|A) .
Assuming that P(e|A∩B)>P(e|A), which is the case in the
context of CF (see the Linda experiment discussed above), it
follows that:
P(A∩B|e)
P(A|e) =
P(e|A∩B)
P(e|A) > 1⇒ P(A∩B|e)> P(A|e),
hence CF occurs. This completes the proof. 
In simple terms, Proposition 2 shows that the occurrence
of BRN leads to the occurrence of CF, i.e., BRN gives rise to
CF.
4.3 Case Study 3: Allais Paradox Framing
Effect
As our third example, we formally establish an IR between
the Allais paradox (APX) and FE. APX can be characterized
as follows. (See Sec. 4.1 for the characterization of FE.)
The Allais Paradox (APX): The Allais paradox refers to
an observed reversal in participants’ choices in two different
experiments, each of which consists of a choice between two
gambles, A and B, while in fact, according to the indepen-
dence axiom of rational decision-making (Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1953), no such a reversal should occur. That is,
although the independence axiom grants the equivalence of
the two experiments, the pattern of people’s preference nev-
ertheless reverses from the first experiment to the second.3
Proposition 3. The following holds:
APX FE.
Proof. The proof is evident from the characterization of
APX given above. Although the independence axiom of ra-
tional decision-making (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953)
grants the equivalence of the two experiments entertained in
APX, the pattern of people’s preference nevertheless reverses
from one to the other. That is, in the case of APX, people
produce different responses for two equivalent experiments.
Therefore, the occurrence of the Allais paradox logically im-
plies the occurrence of the framing effect. This concludes the
proof. 
4.4 Case Study 4: Availability Bias Conjunction
Fallacy
As our final example, we formally establish an IR between
the well-documented Availability bias (AvB) and CF. AvB
can be concisely characterized as follows: (See Sec. 4.2 for
the characterization of CF.)
The Availability Bias (AvB): Extreme events come to
mind easily, people overestimate their probabilities, and over-
represent them in decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973; Lieder et al., 2018; Nobandegani et al., 2018). For-
mally, people overestimate the probability of an event o, p(o),
proportional to the absolute value of its subjective utility u(o)
(Lieder et al., 2018; Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012).
That is, people’s subjective probability of event o, q(o), is
given by4 q(o) ∝ p(o)|u(o)|.
Proposition 4. Let o1 and o2 be two events, and let o∧
denote the event corresponding to the occurrence of o1 and
3The reader is referred to Allais (1953) for a clear description of
the two experiments.
4We must emphasize that our establishing of the IR between
AvB and CF only depends on the broad assumption that the more
extreme an event is, the more people overestimate its probability,
and holds for any q(o) which satisfies this condition, e.g., q(o) ∝
p(o)|u(o)|
√
1+|u(o)|√s
|u(o)|√s (Nobandegani et al., 2018). Therefore, the
assumption q(o) ∝ p(o)|u(o)| made in the characterization of AvB
is only one choice out of infinitely-many possibilities satisfying the
said condition, and hence, is not necessary.
o2 together, i.e., the one corresponding to the conjunction of
the two events o1 and o2. Assuming that ∀i= 1,2, |u(o∧)| 
|u(oi)|, the following holds:
AvB CF.
Proof. According to the characterization of AvB
given above, q(o∧) ∝ p(o∧)|u(o∧)| and ∀i = 1,2, q(oi) ∝
p(oi)|u(oi)|. We have,
∀i= 1,2, q(o∧)
q(oi)
=
p(o∧)
p(oi)
|u(o∧)|
|u(oi)| .
It follows from the axioms of probability that ∀i =
1,2, p(o∧) ≤ p(oi); hence, ∀i = 1,2, p(o∧)p(oi) ≤ 1. However,
since ∀i = 1,2, |u(o∧)|  |u(oi)|, it follows that |u(o∧)||u(oi)| 
1, ∀i= 1,2. Therefore, altogether, ∀i= 1,2, q(o∧)q(oi) > 1 which
implies ∀i = 1,2, q(o∧) > q(oi), granting the validity of the
conjunction fallacy (CF). This concludes the proof. 
The message of Proposition 4 is simple. If people judge
the conjunction of two events to be much more extreme than
each of them individually (i.e., ∀i = 1,2, |u(o∧)|  |u(oi)|),
then the occurrence of AvB leads to the occurrence of CF;
that is, whenever AvB happens, so does CF.
5 General Discussion
In this largely methodological work, we introduce the notion
of implication relation (IR) between a pair of cognitive falla-
cies, formally characterizing how one would logically imply
the other.
A closer examination of Propositions 1 to 4 and their proofs
reveals that IRs can be categorized into two broad types:
logical-IRs (denoted by l ) and causal-IRs (denoted by c ).
Establishing a logical-IR, l , from a fallacy F1 to another fal-
lacy F2 implies that F1 is a special case of F2, with every in-
stance of F1 being an instance of F2. For example, a closer
examination of Proposition 1 and its proof reveals that DE is
a special case of FE, with every instance of DE being an in-
stance of FE in disguise. The same understanding holds for
Proposition 3 and its proof, indicating that APX is simply a
special case of FE, with every instance of APX being an in-
stance of FE in disguise. Hence, using our newly introduced
notation: DE l FE and APX l FE. Establishing a causal-
IR, c , from a fallacy F1 to another fallacy F2 implies that the
occurrence of F1 brings about (i.e., causes) the occurrence
of F2. For example, a closer examination of Proposition 2
and its proof reveals that the occurrence of BRN brings about
the occurrence of CF, i.e., there is a cause-effect relationship
between BRN and CF, with BRN being the cause and CF
the effect. The same understanding holds for Proposition 4
and its proof, indicating that the occurrence of AvB brings
about the occurrence of CF, i.e., there is a cause-effect rela-
tionship between AvB and CF, with AvB being the cause and
CF the effect. Hence, using our newly introduced notation:
BRN c CF and AvB c CF. Drawing further on the analogy
between IR and reduction in computational complexity, it is
worth noting that there also exist several types of reduction in
computational complexity, namely, Karp’s reduction, Cook’s
reduction, truth-table reduction, L-reduction, A-reduction, P-
reduction, E-reduction, AP-reduction, PTAS-reduction, etc.
Importantly, logical-IRs and causal-IRs have quite differ-
ent implications. If F1
l F2 holds (implying that F1 is a spe-
cial case of F2 as discussed above), it then follows that a com-
plete account of F2 should also account for F1, and, in that
sense, accounting for F2 is more demanding5 than accounting
for F1. For example, since DE is a spacial case of FE (see
Proposition 1 and its proof), that is, DE is nothing but FE
in disguise, any complete account for FE inevitably should
also account for DE, implying that accounting for FE is more
demanding than accounting solely for a special case of FE,
DE. However, if F1
c F2 holds (implying that the occurrence
of F1 brings about F2), it then follows that an account of F1
naturally serves as an account of F2 due to the following ratio-
nale: If X causes F1, and F1 causes F2, it then follows that X
causes F2, with F1 serving as a mediator. In that light, estab-
lishing causal-IRs between various cognitive biases/fallacies
has an intriguing implication: For any chain of causal-IRs
F1
c F2 c F3 c . . . c Fn−1 c Fn, any mechanistic account
of Fi naturally serves as an account of Fi+1,Fi+2, . . . ,Fn. For
example, since the occurrence of BRN causes the occurrence
of CF (see Proposition 2 and its proof), it then follows that
any mechanistic account of BRN naturally serves as an ac-
count of CF, with BRN serving as a mediator. This under-
standing has a very intriguing implications for studies of cog-
nitive fallacies in general: Establishing a chain of causal-IRs
F1
c F2 c F3 c . . . c Fn−1 c Fn, clearly reveals which of
the fallacies F1, · · · ,Fn is more pivotal or fundamental to ac-
count for; the answer is of course the left-most fallacy in the
chain, i.e., F1. This strongly suggests that, directing efforts to-
ward finding a comprehensive, satisfying account of F1 would
be the most rewarding research agenda, because, thanks to the
established chain of causal-IRs, we would get a set of com-
prehensive, satisfying accounts of all F2,F3, · · · ,Fn for free!
Therefore, identifying IRs could systematize and guide a re-
search agenda, with a huge increase in research efficiency.
Proposition 4, establishing AvB  CF, demonstrates an
interesting possibility wherein, under a set of auxiliary as-
sumptions (e.g. ∀i = 1,2, |u(o∧)|  |u(oi)| in this case), an
IR can be established between two fallacies. The idea of
establishing IRs under a set of assumptions widens the ap-
plicability of the notion of IR, allowing it to link together
pairs of cognitive fallacies that would have little connections
unless further assumptions are invoked. Drawing again on
the analogy between IR and reduction in computational com-
plexity, it is worth noting that in establishing reductions it is
common practice to evoke various assumptions/constraints on
the characterization of computational problems (e.g. 3-SAT
5Accounting for F2 is “more demanding” than for F1, as a com-
plete account of F2 would necessarily have to explain a wider range
of cases, including all instances of F1 as a subset.
instead of SAT) and/or on the forms of reductions themselves
(e.g. polynomial-time reductions or linear-time reductions).
Importantly, these auxiliary assumptions should be empiri-
cally confirmed, motivating new and exciting experimental
avenues of research. Empirical confirmations of such aux-
iliary assumptions, empirically justifies the validity of invok-
ing such assumptions. Importantly, empirical disconfirmation
of such assumptions, of course, discredit the said established
IR, inviting attempts for establishing other IRs (in the hope
that they would survive empirical tests), or for invoking other
empirically validated assumptions which would save the es-
tablished IR, motivating new theoretical and empirical work.
In this work, as a proof-of-concept, we established
IRs between several well-documented cognitive biases; see
Fig.2(b). Future work should investigate the possibility
of establishing IRs between a wider range cognitive bi-
ases/fallacies, with the ultimate goal of developing a prin-
cipled, comprehensive map of cognitive biases/fallacies,
broadly resembling what is shown in Fig. 2(a) in the con-
text of computational complexity. While many questions re-
main open, and much work is left to be done in this direction,
we hope to have made some progress toward systematically
bringing order to the cognitive fallacy zoo. We see our work
as a first step in this direction.
Much like the fundamental concept of reduction in com-
putational complexity, as eminently featured in the work by
Karp (1972), that revolutionized the fields of computational
complexity and, arguably, theoretical computer science as a
whole, we hope the pursuit of the vision outlined in our paper
to have a comparable impact on the fields of cognitive science
and cognitive psychology.
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